Sequential Composition of Choice Functions

Sean Horan


Montreal


Vikram Manjunath
Ottawa


Conference on Economic Design


Girona

June 16, 2023













Sequential Allocation A way to assign each agent a set of items From y









Why allocate sequentially?

Why allocate sequentially?

- "Simple" allocation rule

Why allocate sequentially? - Simple" allocation rule * Easy for participants to behave Optimally (see e.g. Pycia & Troyan (forthcoming)) * Computationally casy

Why allocate sequentially?

Another (new?) perspective on designing allocation rules

Why allocate sequentially?

Another (new?) perspective on designing allocation rules

Available
items

+

Preferences
of agents

Why allocate sequentially?

Another (new?) perspective on designing allocation rules

Available
items

t

Preferences
of agents

Inputs

Why allocate sequentially?

Another (new?) perspective on designing allocation rules

Available
items

Assignment of sets of
items to agents

Preferences of agents

Inputs

Out put

Why allocate sequentially? designing Another (new?) perspective on allocation rules Available items -> Assignment of sets of items to agents Preferences Available items that are actually assigned of agents

Out put

Why allocate sequentially? Another (new?) perspective on designing allocation rules

Available
items

Assignment of sets of
items to agents

Preferences fix these

Preferences fix these
of agents

Available items that are actually assigned

Inputs

Output

Why allocate sequentially?

Another (new?) perspective on designing allocation rules

Available
items

Available items that are actually assigned
Out put

Why allocate sequentially?

Another (new?) perspective on designing allocation rules

Available
The allocation rule défines an l'aggregated choice function

Available items that are actually assigned
Output

Why allocate sequentially? Another (new?) perspective on designing allocation rules

Available
items

The allocation rule defines an "aggregated" choice function (of course, this collapses the vector into a set)

Available items that are actually assigned
Out put

Why allocate sequentially?

- Preserves "nice" properties of individual preferences

Why allocate sequentially?

- Preserves "nice" properties of individual preferences

If component choice functions are well behaved then their sequential composition is well behaved

C₁, C₂, ..., C_n - n choice functions reflecting agents' preferences


Example:


Organization has two divisions


Example:


Organization has two divisions

C; _ Division is hiring decisions












Example:



Division 2 can't pick the same ones





Example:

(2(Y1964)) Aggregate choice of the organization

Example:

Candidates were "private" goods for the divisions

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What if they are "public" goods instead?


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
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
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
Generalized sequential composition handles that


































Example:



Division 2 can pick the same ones



More examples:

More examples:

- Matching with "contracts"

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Z already chosen

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Z already chosen —> Can't choose more contracts with doctors named in Z

More examples:

- Matching with "contracts"

- Affirmative action in school choice

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- Matching with "contracts"

- Affirmative action in school choice

Z contains too many majority students

More examples:

- Matching with "contracts"

- Affirmative action in school choice

Z contains too many ____ Can only pick majority students minorities

More examples:

- Matching with "contracts"

- Affirmative action in school choice

- Local public goods

More examples:

- Matching with "contracts"
- Affirmative action in school choice
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2 chosen by local authority

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2 chosen by local authority -> residents can
From Z

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- Matching with "contracts"
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2 chosen by local authority -> residents can

 $(E(Z)=X\setminus Z)$

Path Independence (Plott 1973) $C(Y \cup Y') = c(c(Y) \cup c(Y'))$

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· Weaker than rationality

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Equivalent to "pseudo-rationalizability" (Aizerman & Malishevski 1981)

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- · Weaker than rationality
- · Normatively appealing

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 Decisions can be made by considering smaller sets
 - Immunity to agenda manipulation
 - Computational "efficiency"

Path Independence (Plott 1973)

· Weaker than rationality

C(YVY') = c(C(Y)VC(Y')) (Standard Sequential) Composition preserves PI

- Normatively appealing
 Decisions can be made by considering
 smaller sets
 - Immunity to agenda manipulation
 - Computational "efficiency"

Not necessarily

Not necessarily

Example in matching:

E(Z) = { Contracts that name a doctor } who already has a contract } in Z

Not necessarily

Example in matching:

E(Z) = { Contracts that name a doctor } who already has a contract } in Z

Exclusion based on equivalence relation does not preserve path independence (Hatfield & Milgrom 2005, Hatfield & Kojima 2010)

Contribution of this paper: Characterize Es that do preserve path independence

X - universe of "items" (countably infinite)

X - universe of "items"

[X] - all subsets of X

X - universe of "items"

[x]* - all finite subsets of x (menus)

X - universe of "items" $[X]^*$ - all finite subsets of X (menus) $S: [X]^* \longrightarrow [X]$ - set function

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X - universe of "items" [x]* - all finite subsets of x (menus) S:[x] - set function - all set functions Def such that D(Y) Zy tyE[X]* - Dilation

X - universe of "items" [x]* - all finite subsets of x (menus) S: [x] - set function - all set functions Def such that D(Y) 2 y tyE[x]* - Dilation d - all dilations

X - universe of "items" [X]* - all finite subsets of X (menus) S: [x] - set function - all set functions Ces such that C(Y) = y + YE[X]* - Contraction P. - all contractions

X - universe of "items" [X]* - all finite subsets of X (menus) S: [x] - set function - all set functions Ces such that C(Y) = y + YE[X]* - Choice function C - all Choice functions

C, C2 EC <- Choice functions ES L exclusion function Sequential composition of C, and C2 subject to E: $\sum_{E}(C_{1},C_{2})\in C$

C, , C7 E C L Choice functions F es L exclusion function Sequential composition of C, and C2 subject to E: 4 Y E [X]* $\sum_{E}(C_{1},C_{2})$

C, , C7 E C L Choice functions F es L exclusion function Sequential composition of C, and C2 subject to E: 4 Y E [X]* $\sum_{F}(C_{1},C_{2})(Y)$

C, , C7 E C L Choice functions F exclusion function Sequential composition of C, and C2 subject to E: 4 Y E [X]* $\sum_{E} (C_{1}, C_{2})(Y) =$

$$C_1, C_2 \in \mathbb{C} \leftarrow Choice functions$$
 $E \in S \leftarrow exclusion function$

Sequential composition of C_1 and C_2 subject to $E: Y \in [X]^*$
 $\sum_{E} (C_1, C_2)(Y) = C_1(Y)$

$$C_1, C_2 \in \mathcal{C}$$
 < Choice functions

 $E \in \mathcal{S}$ < exclusion function

Sequential composition of C_1 and C_2 subject to $E:$
 $V \in [X]^*$
 $V \in [X]$
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Sequential composition of C_1 and C_2 subject to $E:$
 $Y \in [X]^*$
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CPI - path independent choice functions

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E preserves PI over C'CE' if

 C^{PT} - path independent choice functions $E \in P^{TE}$ over $C' \subseteq C^{PT}$ if $E \in P^{TE}$ over $E' \subseteq C^{PT}$ if $E \in P^{TE}$ over $E' \subseteq C^{PT}$ if $E \in P^{TE}$ over $E' \subseteq C^{PT}$ if $E \in C_1, C_2 \in C'$ $E \in C_1, C_2 \in C'$

pres PI - Responsive choice functions (Roth & Sotomayor 1990)

- Responsive choice functions (Roth & Sotomayor 1990) Pres CPI + CE Cres 3 (s), q such that Complete, antisymmetric, transitive binary relation over XU 203 Definitions

Pres C PI - Responsive choice functions

(Roth & Sotomayor 1990)

H CE Cres 3 > (9) such that

integer

Definitions

Pres C PI - Responsive choice functions

(Roth & Sotomayor 1990)

CE C'es = > , q such that

HYEEXT, C(Y) is the 9 >-best items in Y (that beat \$\phi)

•

Definitions - Responsive choice functions (Roth & Sotomayor 1990) pres CPI + CE Cres 3 >, q such that , c(y) is the q >-best items in > HYE[X] path independence Start with preserving over eres.

Definitions - Responsive choice functions (Roth & Sotomayor 1990) Cres CPI + CE Cres 3 >, q such that C(Y) is the 9 >-best items in Y HYE[X] Start with preserving path independence over cres. Necessary conditions on eres are necessary conditions for any C'2 eres

Eis a dilation

Monotonicity:

Eis a dilation

Monotonicity: $+ Z, Z' \in [X]^*$

 $Z \subseteq Z' \Longrightarrow E(Z) \subseteq E(Z')$

All-or-nothing:

All-or-nothing:

$$+ z \in [x]^*$$

 $E(z) \in X$

All-or-nothing: $\forall z \in [x]^*$ $E(z) \in \{x, z \cup E(z)\}$


Cardinal:

te Nugo, w3 = "threshold"

 $t \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0, \infty\}$ $t \in \mathbb{N$

 $t \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0, \infty\}$ $+ z \in [X]^*$ $E(z) = \begin{cases}
z \cup E(\{3\}) & \text{if } |z| < t \\
x & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$

Exclude Z and E(23)



Monotonicity

+ Exclusion

All-or-nothingness

+ Cardinality

 $t \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0, \infty\}$ $t \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0, \infty\}$ $t \in \mathbb{N}$ $t \in \mathbb{N}$

Monotonicity

+ L- Exclusion

All-or-nothingness

+ Necessary to preserve PI

Cardinality

over eres

Also sufficient

Also sufficient

Proposition: HEED,

E preserves PI over Cres

E is a t-Exclusion

E is a contraction

E is a contraction

V

I E also a contraction

Conditions on INE rather than E

$$T'' = \{x \in X \mid \exists z \ni x \text{ s.t. } |z| = n \text{ and } x \notin I \setminus E(z)\}$$

$$T'' = \left\{ x \in X \mid \exists z \ni x \text{ s.t. } |z| = n \text{ and } x \notin I \setminus E(z) \right\}$$

$$T'' = \left\{ 3 \right\}$$

$$T^{n-1} \subseteq T^n$$

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$$T'' = \{3\}$$

$$Denote \text{ such a sequence}$$

$$T^{n-1} \subseteq T^n$$

$$Denote \text{ by } T$$

$$T'' = \left\{ x \in X \mid \exists z \ni x \text{ s.t. } |z| = n \text{ and } x \notin I \setminus E(z) \right\}$$

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$$T^{n-1} \subseteq T^n$$

$$T \setminus E(Z) = Z \cap T^{|Z|}$$

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$$T'' = \left\{ 3 \right\}$$

$$T(E(Z) = Z \cap T^{|Z|}$$

Proposition: $f \in C$, $\sum_{E \text{ preserves PI over } C^{\text{res}}} \int_{C} \int_$

EES - any set function

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Decompose into two parts:

GEED "gross exclusion"

EES - any set function

Decompose into two parts:

GEED "gross exclusion"

REEC "reuse"

EES - any set function Decompose into two parts: GEED "gross exclusion" REEC "reuse" Y ZE [X]* $G_{E}(Z) = E(Z) \cup Z$

EEJ - any set function Decompose into two parts: GEED "gross exclusion" REEC "reuse" Y ZE [X]* $R_F(Z) = Z \setminus E(Z)$ $G_E(Z) = E(Z) \cup Z$

Necessary conditions From "pure" cases Carry over

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Carry over

Claim:

E & S

Te preserves PI over cres

The preserves PI ove

Necessary Conditions From "pure" cuses

Carry over

Claim:

E & S

Te preserves PI over cres

Tes preserves PI ove

Not sufficient though

Account for interaction between the two

Account for interaction between the two

Disjointness: $+ ze [X]^{*}$ $R_{E}(z) \cap E(23) = 23$

Account for interaction between the two

Disjointness: + ZE [X]*

RE(Z) NE({3) = {3} always excluded (by monotonicity)

interaction between the two Account Disjointness: + ZE [X]* $R_{E}(Z) \cap E(23) = 23$ always excluded (by monotonicity) Never reuse something that is always excluded

Account for interaction between the two

Disjointness: $+ ze [X]^*$ $R_F(z) \cap F(23) = 23$

Claim:

E E S

RE is disjoint

E preserves PI over Cres

GE is a t-exclusion -> tENUEO,003

GE is a t-exclusion -> t E MUZO, wz

RE is a T-contraction > ZZ=TOCTCTCTCT

GE is a t-exclusion \longrightarrow t \in $\mathbb{N} \cup \{0,\infty\}$ \mathbb{R}_{E} is a \mathbb{C} -contraction \longrightarrow $\{3=T^{\circ}\subseteq T^{\circ}\subseteq T^{$

$$+ ze[X]^{2}$$

$$|Z| \langle t \Longrightarrow E(Z) = (Z \backslash T^{|Z|}) \cup K$$

$$|Z| \langle t \Longrightarrow G_{E}(Z) = X$$

GE is a t-exclusion
$$\longrightarrow$$
 t \in $\mathbb{N} \cup \{0,\infty\}$
 \mathbb{R}_{E} is a \mathbb{C} -contraction \longrightarrow $\{3=\mathbb{T}^{0}\subseteq\mathbb{T}^{1}\subseteq\mathbb{T}^{2}\subseteq\dots\subseteq\mathbb{T}^{d}\}$
 \mathbb{R}_{E} disjoint \longrightarrow $\mathbb{E}(\{3\})=\mathbb{K}\subseteq\mathbb{X}$ $\subseteq \mathbb{X}\setminus\mathbb{K}$

$$+ z \in [X]$$
 $|z| < t \implies E(z) = (z \setminus T^{z}) \cup K$
 $|z| > t \implies G_{E}(z) = X$
 $|z| > (t, K, T) - exclusion$

Theorem:

E preserves PI

over Cres

(+, K, T)-exclusion

E preserves PI

over (Pres

over (Pres

over (Pres)

E is a

(L,K,T)-exclusion

$$= \sum_{t,K,T} E \text{ is a}$$

$$(t,K,T) - exclusion$$

$$K \subseteq X$$

$$t \in A \cup \{0,\infty\}$$

$$\{3 = T \subseteq T \subseteq T \subseteq T \subseteq X \setminus K\}$$

Proposition:

E is a

$$(\pm, K, \Upsilon)$$
-exclusion

 (\pm, K, Υ) -exclusion

Another way to strengthen the left side.

EE preserves PI

and property T

over cres

over cres

Size Monotonicity (Alkan 2002, Alkan & bale 2003, Fleiner 2003)

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Also called "law of aggregate demand"

(Hatfield & Milgrom 2005)

Size Monotonicity (Alkan 2002, Alkan & bale 2003, Fleiner 2003) $Y \subseteq Y' \implies |C(Y)| \leq |C(Y')|$

Size monotonicity (Alkan 2002, Alkan & bale 2003, Fleiner 2003) $Y \subseteq Y' \Longrightarrow |C(Y)| \le |C(Y')|$

- Comes up in the matching literature * ensures lattice structure of stable set * incentive compatibility of deferred acceptance

Size Monotonicity (Alkan 2002, Alkan & bale 2003, Fleiner 2003) $Y \subseteq Y' \implies |C(Y)| \leq |C(Y')|$

- Comes up in the matching literature * ensures lattice structure of stable set * incentive compatibility of deferred acceptance
 - Responsiveness => PI+SM

Another way to strengthen the left side.

E preserves PI

and SM

Over Cres

over Cres

Another way to strengthen the left side. (=) Eis a (+,K,7)-exclusion LE preserves PI over Pres XXX $t=\infty$ and $\forall n, T=\{3\}$

Another way to strengthen the left side. LE preserves PI (=) Eis a (+,K,7)-exclusion OVER PITSM XIKIE $t=\infty$ and $\forall n, T=\{3\}$

Another way to strengthen the left side. LE preserves PI (=) Eis a (+,K,7)-exclusion and SM OVER CPITISM $XXK \leq 1$ $t=\infty$ and $\forall n, T=\{3\}$

Both expanding the domain and preserving an extra property shrink the set of exclusion functions

1 anks!